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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ftT0j*1-C4 
State of Utah, (Sal t Lake City 
Coroorat ion), 
Plaint i f f /Respondent 
vs 
Jerry McKinley Armstrong, 
Defendant/Appellant 
APPELLATE NO. 330489-CA 
CRIMINAL NO. 33023051TC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from judgement and convict ion fo r d r iv ing under the inf luence and 
dr iv ing without a dr iv ing l icense, both being misdemeanors, i n v i o l a t i on of 
A r t i c l e 5, Const i tut ion of the State of Utah - section 41-6-44, in the f i f t h 
C i r cu i t Court in and fo r Sal t Lake C i t y , State of Utah, the Honorable Shir ley 
McCleve, Judge pres id ing. 
Jerry McKinley Armstronq 
Pro Se 
Utah State Prison # 15774 
Post Off ice Box 250 
Draoer, Utah 84020 
Rodger Cutler and 
Richard G. Hamp 
Attorney fo r P l a i n t i f f 
Salt Lake City Prosecutors 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Telephone: 535-7767 
t L.-3SJ \Lm-+ L E S ^ 
OCT 2 01988 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this honorable Court is invoked pursuant to Amendment 
5, and 14, Constitution of the United States of America, Article 5, Section 
41-5-44, Subsection (1) and (2), Constitution of the State of Utah, Rule 2 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and farther jurisdiction is conferred 
on this Court pursuant it's own Rules, Rule 24 and 27, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals whereby a defendant in a cause may take an aooeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals from a final judqement and conviction had in a lower 
Court. 
In this case final judqement and conviction was rendered bv the 
honorable Shirley McCleve, Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for 
Salt Lake City, Utah, State of Utah (Traffic Division). 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an apoeal found from a judgement determined by the Honorable 
Shirley McCleve, Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
The Judge found the aopellant guilty of driving under the influence and 
driving without a driving license, both misdemeanors, and in violation of 
Article 5, Constitution of the State of Utah - section 41-6-44, after a trial 
held on 32 tif July, 1933. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On approximately June 12 or 13, 1938, at aooroximatelv 2:00 a.m., the 
appellant, Sandra Bankhead, Kenney Farmer, and two other oeoole l e f t the Bunnv 
Club on 17 and Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. When aopellant went to the 
Club he and Mr. Farmer was togeather, which was aooroximately 10:00 or 11:00 
p.m. . At statutory closing time for a l l bars in the Salt Lake City area the 
appellant and Mr. Farmer was about to leave when Miss. Bankhead asked aopellant 
i f he would give her and two friends a l i f t to there residences, appellant sayed 
sure since he had seen Miss. Bankhead of f and on for the oast several vears. 
On the way to the place that was calculated not to be vary far from the 
i1 lustrous Bunny Club, a dangerous s i t u ra t i on surfaced between Miss. 3ankhead 
and the other lady who apoellant tought was a f r iend of Miss. Bankhead. They 
s tar ted an argument that was reaching the ooint were bodylv threats were 
being tossed about. Consequently, appellant wishinq that harm towards e i the r 
of these ind iv idua ls manifest decided the best way to handle the nat ter would 
be to ev ic t ha l f of the argument from his automobile. So aooellant stoooed 
his automobile immediately, turned on emernency f lashers that are factory 
i n s ta l l ed jus t fo r such emergencies, and oroceeded to attemot mi t iqa t ion of 
the argument that was e i the r qoing to cause damane to aooellants automobile, 
or destroy one of the ind iv idua ls l i f e form. 
Such was the state of a f f a i r s confront ing aopellant when oatroleman 
Swin approached appellants automobile f r i s t from the f r o n t , and then from 
the rear , on 12 or 13 June 1933. 
As the arrest locat ion w i l l point out the place of arrest was on a 
res ident ia l s t r e e t , and i t w i l l also ooint out that aooel lant was double 
parked, wi th f lashers on. The appellant is a professional d r iver with over 
three-hundred thousand every type of weather and hiqhway condit ion coast to 
coast miles d r i v ing eighteen wheels t r a c t o r s - t r a i l e r combanations, without 
exoeriencing any accidents whatsoever. 
When patroleman Swin stopped behind appellants automobile the aooellant 
s tar ted searching fo r his automobile c e r t i f i c a t i o n documents, which he found 
on the sun v isor of the dr iver side of the automobile. Patroleman Swin then 
put his spot l i g h t in aopellants mirrors and asked aopellant to ex is t car, 
which appellant d i d , along wi th automobile documents.This a l l happen in the 
course of approximately one minute, or even a ha l f of a minute. Arquement 
was s t i l l ensuing in appellants automobile. 
Upon ex is t ing his automobile the appellant immediately went back to 
patroleman Swin's pol ice cruser and asked him i f he would assis t him in 
m i t iga t ing an argument that was get t ing out of hand in his automobile. Pa t ro l -
eman Swin then asked aooellant, M how much have you had to drink toniaht ,f? 
Appellants answer was, " not much.'1 In the mean time while aonellants back 
was turned to his automobile two or three of the peonle in the car had 
gotten out and was standing outside aooellants auto as aopellant observed 
upon being escorted to the curb to beain takinq the field sobriety test. 
Appellant must ooint out here that officer Swin never even asked one 
single question concerninq the oroblems I told him that I was havinq and 
such being the same reason that aooellant was stooped in an illegal oarkinq 
manner. Nor did patroleman Swin ask the young lone lady who was standing 
around after everybody else had taken flight, wheather or not mv request for 
helo was genuine, or wheather anybody was in an arquement or not. Aooellant 
also would like to point out that Mr. Farmer, the individual who aooellant 
brought to the bar with him, took flight alonq with Miss. Rankhead and the 
other individual, whoes name aooellant does not know. 
If aooellant had professionally tought the probability of another 
motirist not seeing aopellants automobile oarked at the exact location in 
which it was parked; so aooellant could address the arquement situration, 
outweighed the probability of someone getting hurt or killed as a results 
of the arguement going on in appellants automobile, aopellant would have 
not parked in an illegal manner. However, the arquement in appellants car 
had reached very dangerous levels and apoellant, thus, applied emerqency 
brakes to deal with a life and death situration. 
Consequently, all the aooreciation that aooellant received was a 
driving under the influence without license conviction and six months in 
Utah State Prison. 
The appellant is not a patroleman by oatroleman Swin's standards, 
neither does he characteristically profess to know the whole personalities 
of the individuals who were in his automobile that niqht in June. But 
appellant does know that if someone had gotten killed why patroleman Swin's 
concerns orioritys were on giving appellant a field soberity test, oatroleman 
Swin would have been grossly negeligent of his official duties which he swore 
to uphold upon entering the law enforcement vocation. 
Before or while the appellant was takenina the field soberity test, he 
told patroleman Swin that he was also takening mental hygiene medcine, and 
appellant feel oatroleman Swin had the option to elect pursuance to sections 
41-6-44, and 41-6-44.10, Article 5, Constitution of the State of Utah, which 
chemical test or test of appellants breath, blood, or urine, which best suited 
the purpose of determining if appellant was statutorily orohibited from 
operating his own automobile. Appellant feels that a blood test ought to 
have been the factor which determined the combination of alcohol contents, 
as^ determinative of the drug -joontents present in apoelants system uoon him 
issuring appellant an arrest for driving under the influence. Appellant find 
no fairness in the Court which allowed the admissibility of the breath analysis 
test because appellant is and was on precribed mental hygiene medication. And, 
41-6-44, states: " a peace officer shall determine which of the aforesaid test 
shall be administered." See allegations: 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of appellants 
document - "appeal for driving under the influence conviction" filed with this 
Court already. 
Article 5, Constitution of the State of Utah, 41-6-44, subsection (1) 
states: " that it is unlawful and punishable if a person have a combined 
influence of drugs or alcohol greater than .08% to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, or to be in actual physical 
control of such vehicle in this State." 
Appellants alcohol contents, he thinks, read 104%, at the issuring of 
the driving under the influence arrest. 
This section states farther: " upon a second conviction within five 
years after a first conviction, the Court shall impose a mandatory iail 
sentence of not more than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail." The appellant admitts 
to this Court that the culmination value of apoellants drivina under the 
influence causes egualls two within the statutory f ive year time soan 
prescribed by State Law. But for the sake of appellant his reasoning uoon 
mult ipl ication factors deDloyed by the 3oard of Dardons whoes common 
denominators fact findinn cr i ter ias convenient!v allows i t to sentence 
individuals, just because they are on parole, to more time than the 
State Constitution reguirements statutor i ly dictates regardino misdemeanors. 
At the conclusion of serving this time, only mv second driving under the 
influence in forty years of dr iv ina, the appellant w i l l have served 
exactly one f u l l year in this Prison for a combined total of two drivinn 
under the influence convictions, plus meeting the other reguirements that 
the highest order of Law in this state, s tatutor i ly reguires. Appellant has 
even stayed in the drunk tank overniaht??? 
Appellant has already addressed the fact that purviews of the1double 
jeopardy1 clause indicated that some controversy could emerge regarding the 
Constitutionality of how the rational comoonents of this States statutorv 
Laws are reflected within the guidelins of Adult Probation and Parole and 
the Board of Pardons, insofar as their procedures and processes which 
determines a probationers, or oarolee, inconseguential infractions uoon 
the States statutory Rules of Law measures, comparable to measures of 
punishments prescribed for other Citizens of this State who are not clients 
of their ins t i tu t ions. 
What, then, your honors, constitues a true and fa i r aoDrehension^of 
this State'SuLaws. I t is ap violation of the Constitution of the United 
States of America to discriminate against any class or race of oeoole, or 
individuals. But seemingly that is precisely what the Board of Pardons does 
regarding parolee. That in no form can be considered eguall protection as 
the promulgators of the eguall protection clause intended. 
The appellant cites Waller_ys Florida,, 397 U..S. 387,_ 25 L. ED. 2d 435, 
g ^ CT 11RA w^U ,J~~ onn it o ^ i * *<- • - -
his already filed document: motion to vacate judgement and order pursuant 
to 28 USC 2255 and 13 USC 4244. The appellant additionally aoplys 23 USCA 
2254, and Rule 2, United State Code Annototed, Title 23, Judiciary and 
Judicial Procedure, Section 2255. 
Considering all factors present and demonstrative of the events 
whoes specific fractions formed the basis differences which resulted in 
appellant landing in Prison, meaning appellants arrest, within the context 
of how the State of Utah Constitution discerns on " to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely drivinq a vehicle." The appellant frame this 
to mean in layman terms, that a person driving a vehicle under substances 
contents above the States .08% statutory alcohol level is not necessarily 
'incapable of safely driving', but if he has established a drivinq oatterninq 
of reckieness whereby that persons automobile is beinq controled by influences 
other than that oersons normal self, then, that person is in violation of the 
driving under the influence statutory laws of the State of Utah. 
The elements of appellants actions, nor the elements of appellants 
intentions, are determining factors which would have lead a prudent person 
to believe that the appellant was, citing instant of arrest, 'incapable of 
safely driving' his automobile.Because appellant was not drivinq when oatrol-
eman Swin approached his automobile. This impass, consequently, reqardinq how 
patroleman Swin reached his conclusions about appellants inability to operate 
his automobile, confounds appellants far beyound his comprehension of what 
the promulgators of the words arrangement 'incapable of safely drivinq a 
vehicle', 'to a degree', had in mind regarding formulation o* statues which 
would allow the States law enforcement arm the opportunity to apprehend the 
incapable and unsafe driver. 
The Federal Social Security Act, 42 USC $ 416 (i)(l), now defines 
"disability" as (A) "inability to enqaqe in any substantial gainful activity 
by reason of any medically determinable Physical or mental inoairement which 
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 Months: or (3) blindness'. 
Appellant hereof contends that the Court of the trial instant ounht 
to have ordered a hearinq determinative to the mental sufficiencv of 
appellant to qrasp the handle of the intricate trial instant. Suanestive 
to corresoondinq issues as to wheather aonellant should have been confined 
to a hospital or orison envioronment. An individual who is functional in 
a hospital setting, may not be functional in a orison settinq. 
The appellant knows that he has already mention the fact that he 
frames the rules of law that he has read as creatinq controversy revolvinq 
the elements of this cause interdependent with freedom of speech, and due 
process of law, pursuance to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States of America. Analyzinq this imoass farther the 
appellant must compare the efforts of his court appointed counsel to that 
of efforts of one receivinq compensation for collective barqaininn an 
individuals life away. In the instant of trial where the appellant asked 
his counsel of records to subpeona all of the individuals ridinq'tn tits 
automobile the night of instant of arrest, counsel told aoDellant that 
what they would have to say in trial, would be'irrelevant' to aooellants 
inquiry. Appellant, thus, states that his counsels conduct was unsatis-
factory, and harbored controversy in light of undermininq the orooer 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial manifestations are 
not reliable as having produced fair and just results. Appellant, therefore, 
cites: Strickland vs Washington, 466 U. S. at 638, and 687. 
It must be mention to this court that Miss. Bankhead was too a client 
of the Adult Probation and Parole Departments, Utah Department of Corrections, 
Intensive Supervision Program. Appellant has discovered this fact since he 
landed in Prison. 
Appellant would also like to inform this court at this time that his 
automobile had commercial license olates. A type of plate which allows the 
vehicle to park in a yellow curb, and to stnp .anywhere with proper signals. 
Therefore, inasmuch as anoellant harboring touohts that his laymans 
conception about the rationale and interpretations of the various rules, cases, 
and statutes cited herewithin, and hopefully conveved in light of this Court 
finding different determinative factors which mav promote appellants nuest for 
oroperly framed and reasonable iustice; he shall respectful!v attempt to bring 
this retaliatory to a conclusion through farther conveying his lavmans side 
of this coin as to wheather or not genuine orobable cause coniunctive with 
illegal search and seizure raises sensational controversy renardino the instant 
of arrest. 
According to the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 5 - Driving 
'Jhile Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, section 41-6-43, subsection (2); orobable 
cause, in the instant of a oatroling oatroleman detainina an individual sunected 
of driving under the influence, exists when: " an ordiance adooted by a local 
authority that governs reckless driving, or driving a vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or orooerty shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this code which govern those matters." (found in Utah Code 1934-35, 
volume 2, Title 30-55). 
Conseguently, since appellant has already stated to this Court, purviews of 
section 41-5-44, which lays down the law of the Utah land regardino where and 
how an individual constitutes tremor uoon this section of Utah law in regard to 
driving an automobile under the influence of substance, the issue remainina 
which need conveying to this Court reflects that nonewhatsoever orobable cause 
was present at instant of arrest, and instant of encounter, which statutorly 
required patroleman Swin to request appellant yield to a driving under the 
influence field sobriety test. 
It is a fundamental legal principle that criminal punishment should not be 
visited upon the blameless. An illustration of this principle was affirmed in, 
State vs Robinson,(MotSup.) 328 S. W. 2d 667, " If a person commits an act 
under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed to him since, in 
effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to the act." 
Citing, Newman and Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law, 30 So, 
Cal. L. Rev. 313, 
And as appellant has stated to this Court he only was attempting to 
bestow some kindness upon a fellow human beings when dissent emeraed within 
appellants automobile and confronted him with a horrific dilemma between 
his passengers. The evidence established at appellants trial assaults anv 
other belief or circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to think 
that the appellant did not act with regards reflective of compulsion. 
Thus, affirming the fact that the appellant established no conditions 
which statutorly can be construed as recklessness or negligent under section 
41-6-44, justification from appellants 'horrific dilemma1 compels him to 
hitch his defense to coercion pursurance to State vs St. Clair, (Mo. Sup.) 
262 S. W. 2d 25, 27 based upon the following brief arguement, 
11
 a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average 
member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear." 
And appellant hereof respectfully rest the foreqoing issues conveyed 
in this laymans arguement. 
Dated this pay of October, 1933. 
cc: ROGER CUTLER and By: 
RICHARD G. HAMP JERRY MCKINLEY ARMSTRONG 
